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Single Idea 12601

[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia ]

Full Idea

According to functionalism, the way things look to you is a relational characteristic of your experience, not part of its intrinsic character.

Gist of Idea

The way things look is a relational matter, not an intrinsic matter

Source

Gilbert Harman ((Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics [1987], 12.3.3)

Book Ref

Harman,Gilbert: 'Reasoning Meaning and Mind' [OUP 1999], p.223


A Reaction

No, can't make sense of that. How would being in a relation determine what something is? Similar problems with the structuralist account of mathematics. If the whole family love some one cat or one dog, the only difference is intrinsic to the animal.


The 13 ideas with the same theme [theories that might explain qualia]:

The way things look is a relational matter, not an intrinsic matter [Harman]
"Qualia" can be replaced by complex dispositional brain states [Dennett]
Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett]
A brain looks no more likely than anything else to cause qualia [Block]
It is question-begging to assume that qualia are totally simple, hence irreducible [Churchlands]
The qualia Hard Problem is easy, in comparison with the co-ordination of mental states [Churchlands]
Are qualia irrelevant to explaining the mind? [Rey]
Pain is composed of urges, desires, impulses etc, at different levels of abstraction [Lycan]
The right 'level' for qualia is uncertain, though top (behaviourism) and bottom (particles) are false [Lycan]
Weak intentionalism says qualia are extra properties; strong intentionalism says they are intentional [Crane]
If qualia supervene on intentional states, then intentional states are explanatorily fundamental [Jacquette]
Qualia are not extra appendages, but intrinsic ingredients of material states and processes [Heil]
The sensation of red is a point in neural space created by dimensions of neuronal activity [Edelman/Tononi]